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TAKING SUPREME COURT OPINIONS SERIOUSLY*
HENRY P. MONAGHAN**
I.
Taking Supreme Court opinions seriously emerged as a topic of
discussion at a lunch I attended last year with several Supreme
Court law clerks. Somehow we came round to a particular three-
judge district court case which I confidently opined was "certain" to
be reversed on the basis of principles announced in prior opinions.
The clerks were models of politeness and circumspection; never once
did they even intimate that the judgment would (by divided vote) be
affirmed.1 But shortly after I had announced my views of that case,
one of the clerks began to prod me, asking whether I simply took the
Court's opinions "too seriously." I allowed that I had been around
long enough to recognize that my notions of principled adjudication
had all they could do to survive in the Supreme Court, given the
force of the conflicting pressures on that body. Turning to a former
student, I then engaged in what I thought to be an outstanding
example of the Socratic dialogue:
Q: When you were on the law review, did you take seriously
what was said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: When you spent the summer clerking for the X firm, did
you take seriously what was said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
* @1980 Henry P. Monaghan. All rights reserved. A shorter version of this
article was delivered on May 1, 1979 at the University of Maryland School of Law as
part of the Morris Ames Soper Lecture series.
** Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Law.
1. The case was Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). In Foley, the Court ruled
that a statute limiting New York's police force to United States citizens did not violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Stevens criticized the majority opinion as irreconcilable with the reasoning and
authority of prior decisions.
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Q: When you clerked on the Court of Appeals, did you take
seriously what was said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: When you go into practice next year, will you take
seriously what is said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you think it is a little odd that the only institution
that does not take seriously what is said in Supreme Court
opinions is the Supreme Court itself?
A: (A smile).
As I later reflected upon this "perfect" demonstration, its
excellence faded. Professor Jones is surely right in emphasizing that,
in constitutional as well as in statutory adjudication, as the text
"gets older and interpretative materials accumulate, the focus of
professional and judicial attention shifts from the ... text and
history to the judicial precedents. Argument in a case now centers
not on the text ... but on the norm to be derived by analysis and
synthesis of the judicial precedents. ' 2 Thus, inferior tribunals,
lawyers, professors, and law students have little practical alterna-
tive but to take seriously not only what the Supreme Court does but
also most of what it says in support of what it does.3 But the way in
which the Supreme Court or its individual Justices should view the
precedents presents questions of a different order. Although the
matter is not problem-free, general agreement exists that openness
and candor should accompany any effort by the Court to abandon or
2. Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. REV. 1
(1979). I have criticized Professor Jones for what I believe to be his excessive
assimilation of common law to constitutional adjudication. Monaghan, Professor
Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L REv. 87 (1979).
3. When the Supreme Court "does" but "sayeth not," as in cases of summary
affirmance, different problems are involved. Although these dismissals are rulings on
the merits so far as they reject specific challenges and leave the judgment appealed
from undisturbed, they lack the precedential value - at least to the Supreme Court
itself - of a formal opinion. They represent only that the judgment appealed from
was correct as to those federal questions raised; they do not represent the Supreme
Court's agreement with the lower court opinion. See Washington v. Confederated
Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n. 20 (1979); cf. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173
(1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (precedential effect of Supreme Court
summary affirmances on lower courts). Similar problems exist when a majority
opinion is lacking. The stare decisis effect of cases in which the majority agrees upon
the result but not upon the supporting reasoning is discussed in Comment, Supreme
Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 99
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions].
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cut down its earlier pronouncements. 4 The Burger Court has received
hard but justifiable criticism on this score in a wide variety of
contexts, ranging from its narrowing of the Miranda doctrine 5 to its
holding that state-authored "defamation," standing alone, does not
implicate any "liberty" interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.
6
Beyond considerations of judicial candor the problem becomes
more complicated. The question of the appropriate internal authority
of the Court's opinions - their stare decisis effect - is not resolved
by the observation that other tribunals are bound.7 Indeed, the
received tradition among most Justices and commentators denies
that members of the Court are or should be meaningfully con-
strained by stare decisis. The code phrase often attached to such a
position is that stare decisis has "less weight" in constitutional
cases,8 which usually means that stare decisis has no weight when
the constitutional law on a particular subject seems, to a majority of
the Court, to be in need of correction.
4. This subject is far more complicated than the single sentence in the text
suggests, but it is beyond the compass of this paper. The techniques employed by the
Supreme Court to overrule precedent are discussed in Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright:
The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 211. Professor Israel explains that
precedent is generally overruled on the basis of either changed conditions, the lessons
of experience, or the existence of inconsistent precedent. Id. at 219-26. Precedent may
also be overruled by reexamination and reinterpretation of the basis for the earlier
decision. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for example,
the Court reexamined the legislative history upon which it had relied in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and found its earlier reading was faulty. For a collection of
cases and materials discussing the occasions upon which the Supreme Court has
overruled prior decisions, including a discussion of the judicial discretion that leads to
overruling, see Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57
MICH. L. REV. 151, 154-56 (citing other studies), 184-94 (table of overrulings) (1958).
5. The Burger Court's approach to a strict construction of the Miranda doctrine
is critically analyzed in Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup.
CT. REV. 99, in which Professor Stone observes that "In its unyielding determination
to reach the desired result, the Court has too often resorted to distortion of the record,
disregard of the precedents, and an unwillingness honestly to explain or to justify its
conclusions." Id. at 169.
6. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), criticized in Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 424 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Of "Liberty" and
"Property']. For additional criticism, see sources cited id. at 424 n.131.
7. I recognize that stare decisis also embraces questions relating to the attitude
of hierarchically inferior courts to precedent, but that aspect of the problem is beyond
the scope of this article.
8. This phrase is often accompanied by an excerpt from Justice Brandeis'
dissenting opinion in Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932):
[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its
earlier decisions. The court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of
19791
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This willingness to abandon stare decisis is not adequately
accounted for by the explanations usually advanced: the half-
believed platitide that the only "correct" rule of decision is "the
constitution itself, and not what we [the Court] have said about it,"9
the undiscriminating assertion of a social and political need to
discover the "correct" constitutional rule in every case, 10 or the
legislature's inability to overrule the "erroneous" decision through
the ordinary political processes.11 At least among commentators, the
level of indifference towards (or indeed distaste for) stare decisis has
its real roots elsewhere. In part it is a function of the substantive
constitutional philosophy endorsed by each commentator. Those
who, like Professor Tribe, avow that the key constitutional clauses
are "open-textured" and "unfolding" recognize the self-defeating
nature of any insistence upon stare decisis. 12 This is, a fortiori, true
for those who view the Supreme Court as "physician" responsible for
the ongoing care of a "living," one hopes "robust," patient (the
Constitution); they can hardly be expected to welcome the bony
fingers of the past's dead hand around the patient's throat.
Moreover, stare decisis is simply an unwelcome nuisance for the
commentators whose concerns center upon the outer boundaries and
better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978). For a collection of cases and
authorities discussing stare decisis and constitutional decisionmaking, see Ellenbo-
gen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied, 20
TEMP. L.Q. 503, 506-12 (1947), and authorities cited in Kocourek & Koven, Renovation
of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL L. REV. 971, 984 n.68 (1935). In a
Cardozo Lecture, condensed for publication in the American Bar Association Journal,
Mr. Justice Douglas observed that "Justices who in their private practice ...
advise[d] clients with large property interests have been the strongest adherents to
stare decisis and former legislators and schoolmen . .. [have been] least influenced
by it." Armstrong, Mr. Justice Douglas on Stare Decisis: A Condensation of the
Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 35 A.B.A.J. 541, 543 (1949).
9. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
10. Surely some aspects of some constitutional provisions are not of substantial
social importance. In my opinion, decisions construing the seventh amendment's
right to trial by jury, as well as many of the decisions interpreting the double jeopardy
clause lack the social importance necessary to justify a departure from stare decisis on
this ground.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-2 (Supp. 1979). See also E. LEVI,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 59-60 (1949); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49
COLUM. L REV. 735, 736-37 (1949). But see the efforts by former Justice Goldberg, a
Justice who viewed the key clauses as "open-textured," to protect the expansive
holdings of the Warren Court with a strong theory of stare decisis. A. GOLDBERG,
EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN COURT ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT (1971).
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expanding territories of constitutional law. Because these scholars
do not believe that any of their favorite constitutional edifices will be
torn down, they are intent upon rationalizing the remainder of the
subject according to their individual beliefs. That process necessarily
involves some overruling, and these commentators are willing to
abandon stare decisis for the opportunity to lodge their own
constructions within the Court.
More fundamentally, the minimal role of stare decisis in
constitutional cases reflects the corresponding weakness of the
doctrine in common law adjudication. Dean Levi posits that the
American doctrine of stare decisis permits a court to realign prior
cases in terms of the material facts as it sees them; the precedent-
setting court's view of the material facts, the controlling rules, or the
operative theories are not binding upon the non-precedent court. 13
Dean Levi surely captures the essence of the professorial attitude
toward cases. Professors have, for many years, astonished students
with their perceptive rerationlizations of the cases. What student has
not thrilled to "Don't these cases really reflect. . ." or some similar
incantation? 14 Even if Dean Levi did not accurately describe the
attitude of judges thirty years ago, he would surely find many
companions among the new breed of social engineers who are
assuming judicial office in increasing numbers. Moreover, these
judges are quite comfortable simply overruling precedents which
they are unable to rerationalize. 15 It is only slight exaggeration,
13. E. LEvi, supra note 12, at 1-4. This "flexibility" in the application of
precedent had been previously recognized by Max Radin in a 1933 article. Radin, Case
Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prtijudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REv.
199 (1933). Radin, however, apparently believed that the rule, not the facts,
constituted the precedent. Id. at 210.
14. At least one practitioner has blamed the methods of teaching in our law
schools, coupled with the presence of academics on the bench, as factors in the decline
of the status of precedent. See Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare
Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV. 158, 169-70
(1946).
15. For those judges who can so easily overrule precedent, any significant claims
stare decisis may impart can be accommodated through the device of prospective
overruling, a position advanced by Kocourek & Koven, supra note 8. By limiting an
overruling decision to prospective effect only, "the courts can, without any reluctance,
overrule those precedents which do not meet the standards and requirements of
contemporary society," id. at 973, while they preserve the virtues of traditional stare
decisis: certainty, stability, and order in society, id. at 972-73. The Supreme Court has
made extensive use of the technique of overruling prospectively except for the case
before it in cases concerning criminal procedure. E.g., United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531 (1975). See also Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973) (state court not
constitutionally compelled to make new construction of statute retroactive).
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therefore, to say that, in the common law area, stare decisis is no
longer a justificatory doctrine. Rather, it is simply an expository
style or technique which impels a court, so far as practicable, to
"place the situations they are judging within the generalized class of
some existing decision. ' '16
The weakness of stare decisis in the common law area is not
simply a reflection of rapidly accelerating social and economic
change. It is also a function of pervasive and deeply felt intellectual
currents. Since the seventeenth century the western world has
witnessed an apparently inexorable decline in beliefs of permanence
with respect to any form of social or intellectual ordering, a decline
which has accelerated sharply in this century. 17 In the United
States, this decline has been sharply reinforced by the emergence
and dominance of pragmatism in philosophy and its jurisprudential
handmaiden, "pragmatic instrumentalism."' 8 These developments
generate an attitude that in each case the "law must be argued
for,"19 with the inevitable result that any appeal to authority
possesses little innate attractiveness. 2° And if stare decisis cannot
16. Radin, supra note 13, at 212. See R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION
50-53 (1961) (discussing and criticizing this liberal view). The most provoking
illustration for the proposition that stare decisis, at least in the common law area, is
merely a matter of expository style or technique, is Karl Llewellyn's iconoclastic list of
sixty-four different ways to handle precedent. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADrION 75-91 (1960). Llewellyn's list has been summarized as comprising "eight
ways to follow but constrict a precedent, eight to stand by it, thirty-two to expand it,
twelve ways to avoid it and four to kill it." Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21
WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1043, 1051 (1975). Professor Wise's article presents a more
reverential attitude towards the role of stare decisis in our society.
17. E.g., F. BAUMER, MODERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT, CoNTiNurrY AND CHANGE IN
IDEAS 1600-1950 (1977); Delaney, Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law:
A Humanistic Perspective, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 831, 851-60 (1978).
18. "Pragmatic instrumentalism" has been described as America's dominant
philosophy of law. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's
Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HAiv. L REV. 433 (1978). Professor Summers
characterizes the instrumentalists as theorists who "reacted against formalism,
conceptualism, and narrowness in analytical jurisprudence and in substantive law.
They conceived of law not as a formal system or an inert matter but as a goal-directed
activity designed to resolve or alleviate problems of group life." Id. at 433. Law, as
viewed by the instrumentalist becomes "far more than a mere source of structured or
conceptual issues in which jurists... may deploy their tools. Goals for law, how law
is made, the way it works, its effects, how it changes and its potentialities and limits"
become the objects of jurisprudential study. Id.
19. Id. at 441.
20. Presumably, this modern philosophy of law prevents the preservation of
precedent by a generalized appeal to authority. Rather, precedent will only prevail
where there is a concrete, focused analysis on the "disadvantages of making [the
particular] change." Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12 (1966).
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maintain its grip on the common law system which spawned it, can
there by any wonder that it has fared still worse in the high-pressure
atmosphere of constitutional law?
But what of those of us who have a relatively narrow view of
judicial authority under the Constitution, particularly those of us
who would assign determinative weight to original intent, modestly
conceived, in interpreting constitutional provisions? Can we too
ignore the claims of stare decisis? I would very much doubt that any
amount of reflection will convince me to embrace such a view, for its
consequences are, for me, potentially far too destabilizing.21 For
example, regardless of the propriety of the original determination
that voting in state elections is an interest protected by section one
of the fourteenth amendment 22 or that the provision imposes the
substance of the first amendment upon the states,23 each of these
determinations is far too deeply embedded in the constitutional order
to admit of reassessment. 24 I do not think that an individual
appointed to the Court could responsibly base his vote, in relevant
cases, on the theory that only the national government is bound to
respect free expression or the theory that the fourteenth amendment
was never intended to reach suffrage qualifications. 25 Nor -
although this is a different issue - could five Justices responsibly so
decide, although a solid case on the merits could be made if these
matters were considered de novo. History has its claims, at least
where settled expectations of the body politic have clustered around
constitutional doctrine.
21. For the - to my mind doubtful - suggestion that the lack of effective stare
decisis in constitutional cases blurs any distinction between a written and unwritten
constitution, see Brown, Construing the Constitution: A Trial Lawyer's Plea for Stare
Decisis, 44 A.B.A.J. 742, 743 (1958).
22. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
24. Like Dean Griswold, "I fear that I am so unreconstructed, that I shall never
understand" how the fourteenth amendment can be extended and applied to these
areas. Griswold, The Judicial Process, 31 FED B.J. 309, 315 (1972). Dean Griswold's
comments were made with respect to the first amendment.
25. For this reason, Justice Harlan's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
(1970) has always struck me as among the most interesting in constitutional law.
Justice Harlan cast a fifth vote against a congressional act lowering the voting age in
state elections to eighteen. Most of his elaborate opinion was designed to show that
voting was not an interest protected by section one of the fourteenth amendment, a
position which I think is historically correct as a matter of the Framers' original
understanding, but which seemed foreclosed by a long and unbroken line of Supreme
Court authority. Justice Harlan admitted this and conceded that if he followed
authority he would have felt constrained to uphold the act. Id. at 152 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, he devoted but a few
1979]
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Hard problems of stare decisis also exist for me at a more modest
level. The shopping center picketing case illustrates my difficulties. 26
Whatever the soundness of the initial holding that picketing at
privately-owned shopping centers is constitutionally protected
activity, the propriety of subsequent decisions strangling and then
interring that holding quite plainly pose questions of a different
order.27 Roe v. Wade28 presents a similar issue. While I think the case
incorrectly decided, 29 I would be reluctant now to disturb its
authority (passing here the question of the scope of that "author-
ity").
The Court's decision last term in Lalli v. Lalli3° presents a
paradigmatic illustration of some of my concerns. Lalli typifies the
frequent judicial failure to consider or disclose how precedent should
be handled in a particular case. By a five-to-four vote, the Lalli court
rejected the claim that an intestacy statute requiring illegitimate
children to present specific proof of paternity in order to inherit from
their fathers violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3' The dissenting Justices found this decision directly in
conflict with the "reasoning" of Trimble v. Gordon,32 a case decided
only two terms earlier. Finding no reason to retreat from the Trimble
decision, the dissenters asserted that the requirements of the statute
at issue in Lalli also violated the equal protection clause.33 Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist cast two of five votes for upholding the
statute, apparently on the simple and unexplained basis of their
paragraphs to the claims of stare decisis, ultimately rejecting it on this "fundamen-
tal" matter. Id. at 218-19. I think he was mistaken on this point. I have grave doubt
that a judge should cast a deciding vote on the basis of a theory, however historically
correct, that is not only unacceptable to his own colleagues but which is unlikely to be
acceptable to any future justice. See Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13
HAaV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 117, 129 n.61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Constitution
Goes to Harvard].
26. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
27. Hudgins v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), recounts the story. See generally
Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L REV. 387, 398-400 (1979).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159.
30. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
31. Id. at 275-76.
32. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See 439 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Trimble,
the Court had invalidated an intestacy statute'requiring paternal acknowledgment
and marriage of the parents as preconditions to paternal inheritance by illegitimates.
33. 439 U.S at 279.
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rejection of Trimble.34 Justice Powell, writing for himself, Chief
Justice Burger, and Justice Stewart, provided what, to my mind, was
an acceptable basis for distinguishing Trimble.35 In so doing, he
completely rerationalized Trimble's decisive elements, thereby
providing a textbook illustration of Dean Levi's common law judge.36
What is deeply unsettling about the attitude of the Justices of the
Lalli majority toward the Court's earlier precedent is their appar-
ently unconscious and certainly unarticulated assumptions about
the appropriate role of precedent in constitutional adjudication.
I recognize that the problem is a complicated one, and that in
any adequate theory of stare decisis questions relating to the criteria
for overruling a precedent will shade into consideration of what
constitutes a "precedent" for purposes of the theory, 37 Still, the
34. Justice Blackmun found very little value in the Trimble decision. He regarded
it "as a derelict, explainable only because of the overtones of its appealing facts and
offering little precedent for constitutional analysis of state intestate succession laws."
Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. Justice Powell noted that the statute at issue in Trimble required paternal
acknowledgment and legitimation of the child through the parents' marriage, while
the statute with which the Court in Lalli was concerned required only that the
paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death.
Id. at 266-68. Justice Powell had also written the majority opinion in Trimble.
36. See notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text supra. Dean Levi, it should be
emphasized, insists that stare decisis has no role to play in constitutional
adjudication. See E. LEvi, supra note 12, at 41. For another example of judicial
"rerationalization," see the discussion of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), in Of
"Liberty" & "Property", supra note 6, at 423. There, this author observed that the
Court's rerationalization of earlier cases recognizing the standing of a plaintiff to
complain about governmental defamation was "startling to anyone familiar with
those precedents," id. at 424, and urged that '"flair treatment by the Court of its own
precedents is an indispensable condition of judicial legitimacy," id.
37. In contexts other than constitutional law, widely divergent concepts of what
constitutes a precedent have been advanced: a principle based on the material facts as
they are viewed by the precedent court, see Goodhart, Determining the Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930), or by the nonprecedent court, Levi, supra
note 12, at 2; the "rules" formulated by the precedent court, see Goodhart, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117, 121 (1959) (commenting on this misnamed
"classical" theory of binding precedent); and the reasons given for the rules
formulated, cf. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of
Common Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 730-32 (1978) (the precedent
consists of "nothing less than facts, issues, ruling, and substantive reasons for those
rulings.").
The contrasting implications among these diverse concepts of precedent are
significant. For example, to view stare decisis as requiring identical decision only
upon identical material facts as they are seen by the nonprecedent court, the position
taken by Dean Levi with respect to common law cases, is to impose little constraint by
the doctrine. Stare decisis, so loosely understood, leaves the nonprecedent court free to
avoid the bonds of preceding cases by recasting their material facts or assigning
reasons to the prior decisions quite distinct from those originally assigned. With this
leeway, courts will seldom be faced with the necessity for explicit overruling.
1979]
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crucial point is that any conception of stare decisis should, at the
minimum, be consciously and articulately held. Beyond that, we
need considerable discussion of the appropriate role for precedent in
constitutional cases. 38 I hope that the present academic concern with
fundamental issues in constitutional theory will include serious
consideration on this subject. 39
Although contrary to the conventional wisdom, perhaps a
version of the doctrine of stare decisis much stronger than that
which now exists in the common law may be maintained in at least
some areas of constitutional law. Professor Tribe's challenges in
limine to any effort at formulating an adequately principled doctrine
do not seem to me insurmountable. Professor Tribe argues that any
use of stare decisis is necessarily contentless and subjective - it is a
"discretionary" doctrine inevitably employed "as a means of
selectively leaving in place just those decisions the commentators
think wrong but whose overruling even they find unthinkable. '40
Although this observation has force, no reason exists to assume it a
priori. Professor Tribe also asks, "[i]f the decisional cornerstones of
the past are to be preserved, does not principled adjudication force
also a preservation of the open-ended modes of interpretation that
38. The need for a recognized, articulated conception of stare decisis also exists in
the area of statutory construction. In California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978),
for example, a divided Court rejected its prior, concededly decisive, constructions of
the Reclamation Act of 1902, and adopted a view of the statute which, by disavowing
dictum in the earlier cases, preserved the "factual" holdings of those cases.
Commenting on what was in reality a plain disregard of precedent, Justice White
noted that:
Our cases that the Court now discards are relatively recent decisions
dealing with an issue of statutory construction and with a subject matter that
is under constant audit by Congress .... Only the revisionary zeal of the
present majority can explain its misreading of our cases and its evident
willingness to disregard them.
Id. at 692 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White went on to advise that until Congress
disturbs the previous cases, the Court should respect them. Id. Compare the Court's
actions in this case with LEvI, supra note 12, at 27-47.
39. Professor Howard Ball has made a shallow effort to consider the appropriate
role of precedent in constitutional cases. See H. BALL, JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP OR
FIAT? (1978). It contains such insights as "an opinion that overturns an earlier
precedent must be well written [sic], thoroughly thought out, and based on an
understanding of the fundamentals of the American legal system." Id. at 225. For
thoughtful analyses of various aspects of stare decisis, see Brilmayer, The
Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement,
93 HARV L. REV. 297, 302-10 (1979); Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 1294 (1966); Laycock, Federal Interference
with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 636,
679-88 (1979); Shaprio, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125
(1972).
40. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 2, criticizing The Constitution Goes to Harvard,
supra note 25.
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such decisions inescapably embodied?" 41 Surely this statement is
open to challenge. Apart from the now discredited Lochner line
of cases, 42 how many decisions openly avow "open-ended modes of
interpretation"? In virtually every case, the Court makes an effort -'
often strained - to disclaim any such authority by finding an
acceptable textual home for its results. In the face of the current
explicit challenges to its authority to proceed in an "open-ended"
fashion, the Court surely cannot invoke stare decisis as having
established the propriety of the very authority the Court has so
persistently denied. 43
41. Id.
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). These cases "are now universally
acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper." Ely, Constitutional Interpreti-
vism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 415 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Interpretivism].
43. General agreement exists that, whatever the intention of its framers and
ratifiers, the fourteenth amendment fastens most of the values contained in the Bill of
Rights upon the states. The controversial issue, however, is the extent to which the
amendment authorizes judicial resort to values not referable to the constitutional text
or the structure it creates. Strongly held positions bearing on that question have
emerged. They range from Raoul Berger's view that section one was initially designed
for the very limited, narrow purpose of guaranteeing racial equality with respect to
certain specified civil (not political or social) rights, such as the rights to contract and
to hold property, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18-19 (1977), to that of Professor Tribe, who reads
the amendment as validating a broad range of nontextually based rights, including
affirmative claims against the government for minimally adequate levels of housing,
welfare, and medical assistance, see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1116-36 (1978). Both
of these views, including the role of original intent in constitutional interpretation, are
discussed in The Constitution Goes to Harvard, supra note 25.
In a series of articles, Professor John Hart Ely advances a middle position.
Professor Ely argues that the fourteenth amendment sanctions careful judicial
scrutiny of legislation which bears heavily and unequally upon those underrepres-
ented in the political process. But Professor Ely emphasizes the intertwined defects injudicial efforts at the formulation of fundamental rights, values, or principles that
lack a solid grounding in the constitutional text. All such efforts inevitably reduce
themselves to nothing more than the imposition of judicial value preferences on the
political organs of government. See Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of
Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978); Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note
42; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, supra note 29.
Moreover, any such judicial conduct conflicts with the core institutional settlement
embodied in the Constitution and reinforced by its amendments, namely, the scheme
of representative government, which assigns policy-making functions to the political
organs of government. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial
Review, supra. These objections to judicial value imposition seem to me insurmounta-
ble, given my belief that no satisfactory evidence exists to show that judicial
development of a lex non scripta reflects the purpose of either the drafters or ratifiers
of the eighteenth century Constitution or of the Civil War amendments. For further
elaboration, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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My purpose here is not to advance a comprehensive theory of the
appropriate role of stare decisis in constitutional cases. I need far
more time for study and reflection to make that effort, even in
tentative form. Suffice it to say that if the doctrine of stare decisis is
to have any viability in constitutional cases - an open question - I
think it will have to be entirely detached from any dependence upon
common law analogies, 44 both in terms of the meaning of a
"precedent" 45 and in terms of the justifications for modification
or overruling.46 I suggest here, however, that before one can theorize
about the possible content of the doctrine, one must first consider
what, if any, underlying conditions are supposed for the develop-
ment of any theory of stare decisis. Stated in general terms, one
must consider the extent to which stare decisis possibilities are
affected by factual and normative premises concerning the nature of
the appellate judicial process. For I think it plain that the non-
precedent court will evaluate the precedents, current or distant,
against some conceptions of how a court works or the precedent-
setting court worked. Although these conceptions will often be well
below the level of the consciousness, they will be present.
II.
We are concerned here with some generally unnoticed supposi-
tions made in connection with the decisionmaking behavior of
multimember judicial tribunals. The most important of these is the
assumption that "opinions of the Court" have a collective character,
that is, that they represent the shared view, in all points of
significance, of those who join in the opinion. That assumption, in
turn, rests upon the further, process-oriented premise that the
44. The English doctrine seems particularly inapposite at this point. The
concerns it reflects were developed with an eye on the fact that until midway through
this century, the House of Lords disclaimed any authority to overrule its precedents.
This strict adherence did not result in any serious consequences because Parliament
could swiftly correct judicial errors. Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 504.
45. In constitutional cases, the Court seems to view the "precedent" as involving
at least the "rules of law" adopted by the majority. E.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S.
205, 213 (1912). See Supreme Court No-Clear Majority Decisions, supra note 3.
46. To the extent that stare decisis has been thought to have a role in
constitutional cases, writers have suggested adherence to the doctrine by invoking
interests similar to those protected by stare decisis in common law adjudication.
Interests such as the protection of property expectations, the general desire for
certainty, and the need for uniformity have been advanced in support of observing
stare decisis in both areas of the law. See Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
as Applied to Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3 HARv. L. REv. 125, 130-31
(1889); Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 504-06.
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internal operations of appellate tribunals are so structured that a
collective interchange among the court's members can occur; we
believe, that is, that the appellate process is one which affords room
for a "maturing of collective thought. ' 47 In easy cases, the
maturation process is relatively instantaneous, for the correct
answer is quickly apparent; in hard cases, the maturation process
occurs more slowly as the need for an interchange of views
increases. The paradigm is the three-judge court, in which the court
is assumed to issue opinions only after the requisite interchange of
views among its judges. And the existence of concurring and
dissenting opinions in these tribunals further reinforces the common
view that the court operates within a framework which encourages
and stimulates interchange among its members.
Our "classical" process assumptions will at any particular
moment only partially reflect reality. The clearest indication of this
fact is the extent to which any current batch of appellate court law
clerks is struck by the disparity between their assumptions of how
appellate courts decide cases and how the cases are in fact often
decided. Their awakening is expressed not only through specific
discussion, but in the law clerks' scarcely concealed amusement that
their (once) esteemed professors write articles intended to influence
the development of the law by the courts. Of course, we prepare
students badly with regard to the premises of the classical model, for
they bring to their courts the assumption that reasons must precede
the court's initial "judgment" rather than follow it, thereby ignoring
the distinction between the process of justifying a decision and its
accompanying psychological states. 48 Nonetheless, a portion of what
the clerks see - for example, vote trading and judicial indifference
- is not reconcilable with the classical mode of how appellate courts
should work. Still, I am struck by the tenacity of the classical model.
Its behavioral assumptions are widely shared. For me the clearest
illustration is, once again, the apparent attitude of law clerks after
47. Curiously, as Professor White observed with reference to the work of legal
scholars in the 1950's, Henry Hart seems to be the first modern commentator to
emphasize the concept of an opinion as reflecting a "maturing of collective thought."
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1973). However, Justice Jackson made a similar
point on the importance of the collective character of judicial opinions in a 1944
article. See Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334, 335 (1944).
48. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 16, at 25-27, admirably deals with this
distinction. See also Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 982, 991 (1978).
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they enter into practice or become law teachers. Most of their
cynicism is gone. How frequently they say - "What did the court
mean here? How could the court have said that? How could Justice X
have joined that opinion in view of what he said in . . T'
I accept Justice Jackson's view that "the first essential of a
lasting precedent is that the court or majority that promulgates it be
fully committed to its principles." 49 My concern is with the
institutional patterns of Supreme Court opinion-making. Do these
patterns, realistically viewed, in fact deter judicial commitment to
promulagated principles? We frequently emphasize the Supreme
Court's relative institutional superiority over the other organs of the
national government in developing a stable, coherent body of
constitutional law. The life tenure of its members, their insulation
from the political process, and the judicial procedure for examining
and deciding questions and recording the results all contribute to
this superiority. 50 The written opinion is both the embodiment and
symbol of these advantages. However, we tend to ignore the question
whether the Supreme Court labors under unique structural disadvan-
tages that impair the classical premise that its members share the
significant points announced in the "opinion of the Court." Put
differently, the question is this: Even assuming the Supreme Court
opinions are adequately principled, given the manner in which
opinions are in fact formulated, to what extent should they be
viewed as containing anything more than the principles of their
writers?
The problem may be framed in a different, and perhaps clearer,
historical context. Professor Fairman in his study of the Reconstruc-
tion Court provides the following description of the Court's internal
operations:
After docketing, a case would wait some two or three years
before in turn it was called for oral argument ....
While this waiting was too long, the process of consideration
was too cursory. Ordinarily the interval between argument and
announcement of the decision was about a month; sometimes it
was even less. When a session lasted about seventeen weeks,
more or less, opinions must be turned out with dispatch.
Ordinarily the Court would discuss and vote on a case on the
Saturday next after argument. The Justice to whom it was
assigned would write his opinion, over say two or three weeks.
49. Jackson, supra note 47, at 335.
50. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed. 1973); Monaghan, First
Amendment Due Process, 83 HARv. L. Rev. 518, 523-24 (1970).
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Then he would bring his manuscript to conference and his
brethren would listen to his reading of it .... This practice
gives pause: the other Justices would generally have no
opportunity to read the opinion and to reflect upon the drafting.
On a Saturday there would be a discussion and then a vote on
cases theretofore undecided, plus the listening to prepared
opinions. That statement "shows to a demonstration" (one of
Justice Clifford's phrases) that the Court as a body could not
have scrutinized opinions to weigh the import of expressions and
omissions. So long as the Justices were satisfied on the major
points, the author was pretty free, one gathers, to choose his
language. It follows that, as compared with what might be
supposed, one is less warranted in attributing to the Court the
very language used, and better entitled to treat the composition
(for praise or blame) as showing the quality of the author.
Evidently there was not a very high sense of corporate
responsibility.
There might be dissent from the Court's decision, or from a
holding on some particular point; but individual notations of
disagreement or doubt merely about implications or dicta were
exceedingly rare. 51
Given the process Fairman describes, the Reconstruction Court
opinions cannot be meaningfully characterized as the end .products
of a process designed to achieve a "maturing of collective thought."
Quite obviously, members of the Court frequently would join an
"opinion of the Court" the day it was read in conference simply
because they "generally" agreed with its content. It is just as clear
that this act could not commit the Justices to all that was said in the
opinion and presumably the Justices so understood. A Justice could
fairly insist upon not being bound by the opinion's "dicta,"
generously conceived, even if the lower courts and the Bar had far
less running room in this regard. Indeed, a member of that Court -
to say nothing of future Justices - might insist upon a distinction
between the "holding" of the precedent case and its supporting rules,
principles, or reasons - between stare decisis and stare dictis - and
believe himself constrained only by the former. 52
51. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88: PART ONE 69-70 (6
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Freund ed. 1971))
(footnotes omitted).
52. The distinction between stare decisis and stare dictis was used by Professor
Oliphant to describe what he viewed as an unfortunate, yet fundamental, change in
Anglo-American law - "a shift from following decisions [stare decisis] to following
so-called principles [stare dictis]." Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71,
72 (1928) (stare decisis involves a narrow rule covering the instant fact situation and
at least one other).
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Similar inquiries are in order with respect to the current
behavioral characteristics of the Supreme Court. How does the Court
operate in the formulation of opinions? This question, in the realm of
behavioral science, is one to which tenative answers can be offered.
The harder question is one of theory. Do we care? Our tradition is to
view the "opinion of the Court" as reflecting some measure of
collective agreement. To what extent is this premise (and its
supporting classical model) a factual or a normative construct? To
the extent that the Supreme Court's actual behavior in the
formulation of opinions departs from the classical model, may its
members discount heavily much of what is contained in the "opinion
of the Court" even if no similar discount is appropriate elsewhere in
the profession? I am ready to suggest some tentative answers,
factual and normative.
III.
The inquiry might usefully start by noting the obscuring
character of the considerable recent controversy, erupting within the
Supreme Court itself, which has focused on what the Court is not
able to do. Repeated suggestions have been made that the sheer
volume of decisions demanding authoritative resolution necessitates
the creation of a new intermediate court. 53 "It is not a healthy
situation," Chief Justice Burger recently said, "when cases deserv-
ing authoritative resolution must remain unresolved because we are
currently accepting more cases for plenary review than we can cope
with in the manner they deserve." 54 The obscuring character of the
current concern over what the Court is not doing lies in the fact that
it has deflected attention from an older and, to my mind, more
central concern. Is the Court doing too much (as well as too little) in
its efforts to dispose of "cases deserving of authoritative resolution?"
Long ago Henry Hart argued that the Court was "trying to
decide more cases than it [could] decide well," with the result that
many opinions not only failed to "genuinely illumine," but indeed,
failed "even by much more elementary standards" of craftsman-
ship.55 Professor Hart thought that the Court's excessive output
53. See, e.g., Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1028-30 (1978)
(Chief Justice Burger, dissenting from a denial of certiorari proposes that Congress
create a "National Court of Appeals" to ease the workload of the Supreme Court).
54. Id. at 1025.
55. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100
(1958).
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impaired the reasoned quality of its opinions; there was, he said,
insufficient time for the opinions to reflect the "time consuming
process" needed for a "maturing of collective thought."5 6 Judge
Thurmond Arnold immediately responded with a heated defense of
the quality of the Court's opinions.57 More fundamentally, however,
he rejected Hart's belief that "reason would replace the conflicting
views now present on the Court if the Court had more time for 'the
maturing of collective thought.' ",58 "There is no such process as
this," he said, "and there never has been; men of positive views are
only hardened in those views by such conferences." 59 The professor-
turned-judge chided the professor for advancing a model of judicial
decisionmaking perhaps appropriate for a court "found in a Trappist
monastery," but one wholly inappropriate for the Supreme Court.
That Court, he said, "is made up of men of deep-seated convictions in
times of revolutionary change when an old order is giving place to a
new. It is just that simple." 60
The differences between Judge Arnold and Professor Hart can
be explained, in part, by their differences over the nature of judicial
power in constitutional cases. While both assumed the propriety of
judicial resort to nontextually based "impersonal and durable
principles," Judge Arnold entertained a vastly more freewheeling,
open ended conception of judicial power to act "in times of
revoluntary change," a conception that at times makes the place of
reason in constitutional adjudication unclear.61 More basic, perhaps,
is Arnold's implicit challenge to Hart's institutional comparison
between the Supreme Court and "ordinary" appellate courts. One
56. Id. A similar observation had been earlier made by Justice Jackson:
[T]he increased volume of opinion affects the intrinsic value of many
precedents .... They are made of baser metals when the pace is fast and the
volume large . . . . You know that legal writing has no kinship with
journalism .... [I]t is slow writing, that the best of it needs clarification by
the candid and critical collaboration of several minds.
Jackson, supra note 47, at 335.
57. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960). It is
interesting to note that Justice Douglas took what may be euphemistically
characterized as the astonishing view that the Justices enjoy "vast leisure." See
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 178 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Arnold, supra note 57, at 1312 (quoting Hart, supra note 55, at 100).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1313.
61. Id. at 1311-13. Judge Arnold warns that if Professor Hart had ever tried to
hold together a majority for a given opinion, "[h]e would find that men can sometimes
agree on a result, but rarely on all of the reasons for that result, and that attempts to
spell out reasons may be futile." Id. at 1312.
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could, of course, emphasize the differences stemming from the nature
of the issues over which the Supreme Court has final responsibility,
surely an important factor in any comparison between the Supreme
Court and other appellate courts. But I am not convinced that the
nature of these issues is a crucial difference. Some attention should
be focused on Hart's premise that in its internal processes the
Supreme Court does not differ markedly from an "ordinary"
appellate court, and accordingly, like any such court its opinions
should be the end result of an adequately structured deliberative
process. 62
Hart's formulation, attractive though it be as a conception, lacks
clarity, for its mechanics are never defined.6 3 At certain points, Hart
can be read as portraying the Supreme Court as a never-ending
graduate seminar in which, by dint of hard and vigorous debate, a
consensus on fundamentals is reached.6 4 Judge Arnold so interprets
Hart when he asserts that "men of positive views are only hardened
in those views by such conferences,"6 5 and when he feigns despair at
the prospect of being locked in a room with Hart to achieve a
"maturing of collective thought. ' 66 In such a graduate seminar
model, opinions that reflect the maturation process are periodically
issued on behalf of seminar members. Such a model seems far too
idealized to describe the way in which any appellate court of last
resort generally functions; in any event it surely is not an accurate
description of the Supreme Court's processes, at least not since Chief
Justice Marshall and his five associates shared common lodgings.
Indeed, the available data suggest a very different model of the
Court's current internal practice. Recently, Justice Powell character-
ized the Court as an institution comprised of "nine small, independ-
ent law firms," and he noted that on occasion a Justice may not
62. Hart, supra note 55, at 100. (Collective thought "is the theory and the
justification in principle of all collegial tribunals, and especially of tribunals of last
resort.").
63. Hart's requirement that the opinions reflect "thought" need not detain us, for
it simply restates the familiar and agreeable demand that the judicial opinion should
be a form of rational thinking.
64. Professor Hart writes:
Ideas which will stand the test of time as instruments for the solution of hard
problems do not come ... in twenty-four hours .... Such ideas have
ordinarily to be hammered out by a process of collective deliberation of
individuals . . . who recognize that the wisdom of all, if it is successfully
pooled, will usually transcend the wisdom of any.
Hart, supra note 55, at 100.
65. Arnold, supra note 57, at 1312 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
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enter the chambers of some other Justices during an entire term of
Court.6 7 The idealized nature of Hart's formulation is further
illustrated by The Brethren, which shows not surprisingly, the
pulling and hauling among the Justices on many cases, with the end
result that decisionmaking seems all too frequently a simple event, a
show of hands, rather than a process of collective thought in any
recognizable sense.68
Although these perceptions are descriptive in nature, they might
be thought to have ascriptive consequences. More specifically, these
perceptions may be thought to import a rather weak conception of
the nature of the collective agreement actually contained in an
"opinion of the Court." I think that any such inference from these
facts is mistaken. Justice Powell's stay-at-home attitude may be
assumed to reflect, more or less, the physical behavior of all the
Justices, but, as I shall show, the collective character of the opinion
is adequately secured by other institutional mechanisms. The
Brethren's "revelations" may be assumed to be descriptive of more
than the idiosyncracies of members of the Burger Court; they
probably depict a tendency inherent in a body which, being at the
center of the intersection between law and politics, necessarily
wields great power. The tendency toward substitution of will - "I
have five votes, that is how I distinguish the contrary decisions" -
for reason. is one which can be, if not eliminated, at least
constrained. That at least is the faith of all those off the Court who
place so much confidence in the Court's capacity to act in a
principled fashion. This confidence is, indeed, the fundamental
premise of constitutional theorizing in this country. If this premise
of reasoned decisionmaking is systematically rejected, constitutional
adjudication is thereby excommunicated from the legal system as
lawyers deal with it. Our legal traditions reject as a working premise
the view, variously framed, that the rational form of judicial
opinions simply masks nonrational imperatives, the origins of which
are explicable in terms of economic factors, motivational psychol-
ogy, sociobiology, or other determinants. Whatever the explanatory
power of these approaches in other contexts, the legal order posits as
67. Address by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (1976), excerpts reprinted in What the Justices Are Saying .. , 62 A.B.A.J.
1454 (1976). Two years later, Justice Powell's former law clerk made similar
observations. See WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE - A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW
(1978).
68. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979). See also TIME, Nov. 5, 1979, at 60-64 ("Inside the High Court").
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an article of faith that there are rational aspects to human
decisionmaking which the adjudicatory process seeks to maximize
through its systematic reliance upon devices such as pleadings,
evidence, oral and written argument, appeals, and - of central
concern - written opinions publicly exposed for criticism as to the
adequacy of their reasoning. 69 Indeed, The Brethren unwittingly
discloses how seriously the Justices take the rational and collective
character of the Court's opinions.70
Even if one rejects a purely "political" view (in the bad sense) of
the Court, one must still ask whether, even with ideally disposed
Justices, difficulties comparable to those faced by the Reconstruction
Court7' so inherently limit any process of collective thought that the
opinions should not be viewed as reflecting the shared views of all
the Justices on their significant points? Two factors, both relating to
size, immediately come to mind. The first is, of course, the sheer
volume of the Court's business. The second is the size of the Court
itself; a busy nine-member tribunal, each of whose members has a
"little law office" of clerks and secretaries, simply cannot regularly
function in the collegial fashion potentially open to a tribunal with
fewer members. 72 These factors make plain that we cannot expect
the Court to "conference" about much of what it does. Still, no
overriding difficulty is presented with viewing the opinions as
reflecting some important shared agreement that is a result of an
adequate deliberative process. For it is surely apparent that, in
theory at least, one can detach the latter concept from any explicit or
implicit graduate seminar model. Modern technology, particularly
the typewriter, the photocopy machine, and the printing press,
permit - probably for the first time since Marshall - a view of the
Court's opinions as containing a "collective" expression. Even nine
separate law offices can produce collective thought, not by talking,
but by writing. Memoranda and draft opinions can be readily
circulated and recirculated, and the process can achieve in a
satisfactory manner the reflective interchange of views posited by
69. See Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process:
An Essay For Lon Fuller, 92 HARV L. REV. 410, 411-23 (1978); Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364-72 (1978); Greenawalt, The
Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 982-83 (1978).
70. Lewis, Book Review, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 1980, at 3, 4 (raising questions
about the accuracy of the book).
71. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
72. Surely it is clear that size has process significance, as would be apparent were
the Court's membership increased to twenty-five.
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Hart.73 Indeed, it is entirely probable that written exchanges of
views are more productive to achievement of collective thought than
are oral discussions; written exchanges offer the opportunity for time
for lengthy reflective, careful second looks, synthesis of views with
ideas that emerge later, and escape from the emotional pressure of
face-to-face encounters. If, as Professor Amsterdam says, the Court's
opinions are best viewed as the product of a "committee," 74 his
conclusion is clearly consistent with "a recognition that an opinion
of the Court is the responsibility of the whole Court and not simply
of the Justice who writes it.''75
There are, however, several features of the present opinion-
drafting process, viewed at the behavioral level, which counsel
against too expansive a view of what is meant by treating opinions
73. Indeed, a careful reading of Hart's Foreword makes clear that actual
"seminar-like-conferences" played little role in his conception of the process behind a
maturing of collective thought. See Hart, supra note 55, at 122-25.This is not to deny
that more oral exchange is also necessary. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 68, at 442-43.
74. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
350 (1974). Professor Amsterdam admits to reading Supreme Court cases in the fourth
amendment area "with the righteous indignation that only academics can consist-
ently sustain." Id. at 349. However, he also finds that critics of the Supreme Court are
not constrained by the institutional characteristics that make it difficult for the Court
to produce a "coherent analytical framework." Id. at 350. Quoted at length, Professor
Amsterdam explains:
[T]he Court is a committee. In various aspects of our social organization,
decisionmaking power is given to committees rather than to single men
because a committee is less likely to be despotic than a single man, and more
likely than a single man to ponder all relevant considerations before coming
to judgment. These characteristics of a committee are indispensable to the role
that the Supreme Court plays in American government. But they have their
price.
The wise joke that defines a camel as a horse drafted by a committee only
begins to describe that price. Insofar as the Court observes - for excellent
reasons - "series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision," and
particularly the rule against deciding "constitutional issues ... on a broader
basis than the record ... imperatively requires," the Court is in the
unenviable posture of a committee attempting to draft a horse by placing very
short lines on a very large drawing-board at irregular intervals during which
the membership of the committee constantly changes. In addition, unlike
most committees, the Court is expected to write a reasoned opinion explaining
the placement of each of these short lines without unduly extending the lines
so as to make perfectly comprehensible why, in its judgment, the resulting
camel is a horse. You will appreciate, I think, that I question the entire
fairness of a critic who rides merrily up upon his own horse and deprecates
the Court's camel by comparison.
Id. at 351 (footnotes omitted). For illustrations of the "committee" character of some of
the decisions, see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 68.
75. Hart, supra note 55, at 125.
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as an embodiment of collective thought. To characterize the opinions
as a "committee" product is only partially accurate. Any opinion
"can be written in an infinite number of ways, ' 76 and thus the
opinion in any multimember court reflects the analysis, style, and
use of supporting authorities of the opinion writer. "The subtleties
may, and often do, express the meaning of the judge who wrote the
opinion," observes Judge Schaefer. But, he cautions, "[t]hey do not
in any realistic sense express the view of the Court as a whole."' 77 An
opinion, therefore, is a mix of individual and committee responsibil-
ity, and given the time and other pressures on the other Justices, I
am reluctant on process grounds alone to charge each Justice with
an excessively expansive view of "shared agreement." Perhaps the
difficulty is met, for present purposes, by limiting the shared
responsibility to "all points of significance" - leaving that
purposely obscure formulation for future elaboration.78
In addition to characterizing the scope of "shared agreement" in
a written opinion, the concept of "all points of significance" provides
a framework for dealing with the systemic difficulties in the
Supreme Court's opinion-drafting process which result from the
Court's work product. Hart is unanswerable in his insistence that
the Court produces far too many opinions every term. 79 It is hard to
give serious reflection to so many issues, even assuming that some
issues are so easy that quick resolution would not impinge upon the
values inherent in the process of collective thought. Justice White is
surely correct in asserting that the Court simply cannot increase the
volume of its written worko The Court should, in fact, reduce the
volume of its writings, particularly its opinions. Instead of taking
that course, the Court presents us with an ever-increasing torrent of
writing - from increasingly prolix "opinions of the Court," through
long concurring and dissenting opinions, to elaborate individual
opinions on such matters as dissents from denials of certiorari and
76. Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 379-80 (1975). The Justices are well
aware of this fact. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 68.
77. Schaefer, supra note 20, at 9-10.
78. That term might be used to cover one or more of the following: material facts,
rules, principles, doctrines, or reasons. Other possibilities certainly exist.
79. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
80. Justice White made this assertion in his dissent from the denial of certiorari
in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1023. See notes 53 & 54 and
accompanying text supra. For statistics as to the written workload of each Justice, see
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 327 (1978).
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rulings on stay applications. 81 The Court as a whole is, to my eye,
insufficiently disciplined in these matters. The means (if not the
cause) seems apparent - the vast increase in the number of
available law clerks. To recognize that law clerks frequently draft
opinions seems to me to prove little, for the ultimate responsibility is
that of the Justices, not of the law clerks. There is only so much to
which one can give serious attention, and most Justices produce far
too much writing for me to feel comfortable with a view that they
give serious attention to all that is issued bearing the Court's
imprimatur.
Finally, the Court hears cases far too late in its term. If we are
ever to avoid the incredible deluge of opinions at the middle and end
of June, some statutory relief for the Court is necessary. The
pressure to "get these out" inevitably produces well-known intellec-
tual disasters in every term. Still, what does one do about that? No
principled theory of stare decisis could allow for a heavy discount of
"shared agreement" in opinions after June 1 of every term.
Taking the factors described above into account, I do not view
the process of formulating opinions as so unstructured that a Justice
could view an opinion as in no way representing collective thought;
neither do I view it as so structured that all aspects of each opinion
can be so viewed. Some accommodating line, such as the difference
between holding and supporting principles, or between principles
and "dicta," can be formulated between these extremes. I have
suggested tentatively a line that process considerations at least
leave open: the opinions may fairly be taken to represent agreement
on "all points of significance." In thinking about the necessity for
some line, however, I submit that Hart was fundamentally correct in
his insistence upon "collectivity" as an aspect of the Court's work.
Collective thought is more than an academic abstraction about the
nature of a court; it is a mandatory goal. I view it as an intrinsic
aspect of the "Supreme Court" established by article III. To say that
each member of that Court takes an oath to support the Constitution
as he sees it, not as others see it,82 does not detract from this point.
81. Justice Stevens expressed his dissatisfaction with the increasingly common
practice of writing opinions with regard to the denial of certiorari in Singleton v.
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940 (1978). Characterizing such opinions as "examples of the
purest form of dicta," id. at 945, Justice Stevens felt that they were "potentially
misleading." "Since the Court provides no explanation of the reasons for denying
certiorari, the dissenter's arguments in favor of a grant are not answered, and
therefore typically appear to be more persuasive than most other opinions." Id.
82. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-02 (1937)
(Sutherland, J. dissenting) ("The oath which a [Supreme Court Justice] takes as a
judge is not a composite oath, but an individual one .... [H]e discharges a duty
imposed upon him.").
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For an appointment is to a Supreme Court, and that concept
embodies something very different from viewing each Justice as a
Leibnitzian monad colliding with eight other isolated, independent
monads only at the point of voting.
8 3
The collegial conception of a Supreme Court carries with it
specific normative consequences for its members. Professor Hart
rightly insists that the votes taken after hearing argument should be
viewed as far more tentative than they are in present practice now.
8 4
And I believe substantially more effort should be made to reduce the
volume of concurring opinions.8 5 This reduction can occur, of course,
only if circulated drafts are taken seriously by the other members of
the Court and if, in turn, the opinion writer seeks to accommodate
the objections and suggestions of others. To what extent any of the
foregoing in fact will occur is, of course, a function of docket size, as
well as of personnel (the Justices)8 6 and occasion (the issues).
Nonetheless, my study of the Court's work for the last fifteen years
leaves me with a distinct impression that there is considerable
unnecessary fragmentation within the Court - that the potential for
unity has been insufficiently realized.
In any event, it is reasonable to insist that the significant points
in the "opinion of the Court" be understood as the result of a
deliberate process which reflects the views of the members joining
that opinion. Of course, some opinions will be insufficiently
principled in the sense that they will contain obscurities. At times
this will result from the necessity for compromise if the opinion
writer truly seeks to issue a collective product.87 On other occasions,
83. This is true even though prior to 1800 the practice of rendering opinions
seriatim prevailed. One still looked for that to which the Court as a whole had agreed.
See Davis & Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,
1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 73 n.70.
84. Professor Hart warned:
To call upon judges to vote on complex and often highly controversial issues
after only a couple of hours, more or less, of private study of briefs and record
is to invite votes which are influenced more strongly by general predilections
in the area of law involved than they are by lawyerlike examination of the
precise issues presented for decision.
Hart, supra note 55, at 124. Perhaps I overstate this point, however, see Stewart,
Inside the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1979, at 1, cols. 2 to 4. See also B.
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68.
85. Cf. Davis & Reynolds, supra note 83, at 75-76 ("strategically placed"
concurring opinions sometimes have a "very special value").
86. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent and the Background of the Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194 (1962).
87. See Arnold, supra note 57, at 1312.
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the obscurity will appear in hard cases - situations in which an
acceptable controlling principle cannot be adequately perceived until
fleshed out by a series of cases.s8 Seeking the goal of an adequately
principled opinion reflecting shared agreement is, after all, not a
demand for impossible perfection. The premises of our legal system
do assume that in practice an adequately principled opinion is a
generally achievable goal, and in any event, a necessary aspira-
tional feature of the judicial process. Accordingly, the inevitable
imperfections in the opinion-making process do not support
Professor Amsterdam's contention that the opinion may properly
omit factors in fact relied upon by the Justices.8 9 Although I
recognize the pragmatic attractions of such a view, it seems to me
wholly inconsistent with the root concepts of principled decision-
making resulting in an opinion publicly exposed for criticism. To be
meaningful, these concepts must govern the reality as well as the
appearance of judicial opinions. If justifications cannot be stated in
the opinion, they should not be relied upon in entering the judgment.
A Justice who initially reached a decision on the basis of factors he
is unwilling to assert publicly as a justification is, to my mind, under
a duty to reconsider his decision with the impermissible factors
excluded so far as is humanly possible. Unlike Professor Greena-
walt, I would not permit even an "occasional sacrifice" of this
principle in order to advance other "most compelling" goals.90
IV.
I recognize that this article has some of the quality of a
production of Hamlet without its Prince. This is a necessary
consequence of addressing the subject of stare decisis in constitu-
tional cases without advancing, even in tentative form, a substan-
tive theory of the topic. But that effort must await another day -
and it must be undertaken with a mind open to the possibility that
no meaningful theory can be formulated. My goals here have been
88. See Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 351-52; Greenawalt, supra note 76, at
1001-02 (quoting Freund, Rationality in Judicial Decisions, in NoMos VII: RATIONAL
DECISION 109, 119-21 (C. Friederich ed. 1964) & E. RoSTOw, THE SOVEREIGN
PREROGATIVE - THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 33 (1962)).
89. Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 350-51. But see B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 68, at 406-07.
90. Greenawalt, supra note 76, at 1013. On efforts to justify some prudential (read
here: unprincipled) limits on the need for principled decisionmaking, compare A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
'Passive Virtues' - A Comment on Principle and Expediency In Judicial Review. 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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more modest: first, to demonstrate that the subject is an important
one that deserves fresh consideration and, second, to suggest that
nothing intrinsic to the process of formulating Supreme Court
opinions precludes an initial view of the opinion as a principled
product that represents both collective thought and collective
agreement "on all points of significance." Discovery of an appro-
priate content to a "points of significance" approach to the problem
remains in the process of gestation: the labor is hard, but the task is
attractive.
